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This post looks at emergency law responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in conflict-
affected states in transition. While some type of emergency response to Covid-19
has been used in most states, we suggest that conflict ‘fault lines’ can mean that
emergency law responses have a capacity to undermine transitions. We suggest
four key areas of concern: 
1. How emergency law has impacted on efforts to build the rule of law as a
mechanism of transition;
2. The impact on timing of elections and governmental succession;
3. The impact on relationships between the central state and divided groups in
sub-state regions; and
4. The impact on militarisation of the state.
Whether or not these issues operate to trigger wider conflict fault lines is inherently
linked to histories of conflict, and differ in terms of relevance from one setting to the
next.
This piece identifies and illustrates the ways in which Covid-19 emergency
responses can impact on these areas of concern, and suggests policy responses
to ensure the continuation of the transition post-Covid-19. These are based on the
deliberations at the Seventh Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-
Building, held in December 2020. The Edinburgh Dialogues are the result of a
partnership between International IDEA, the University of Edinburgh’s Political
Settlements Research Programme, and the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law.
The Rule of Law
Transitional societies often approach building the rule of law as key to conflict
resolution. The legal grounding upon which Covid-19 emergency measures are
taken is crucial to either supporting or hindering democratic development. Covid-19
responses have indicated different ways of institutionalising an emergency response.
States like Ethiopia and Mali have declared a constitutional state of emergency.
Some countries like Nepal, Myanmar and Kenya have relied on existing legislation.
In different ways and to varying degrees, these models support transitions in that
executives remain within existing legal frameworks. In other cases, however, states
have exerted emergency powers with no clear legal basis. For instance, Somalia
and Sudan have each taken measures to combat Covid-19 without any reference
to specific legal instruments. During the formative stages of the pandemic, the Sri
Lankan government imposed an island-wide lockdown with no clear legal basis.
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Where states act in ways that appear to have no legal basis, this undermines
progress towards a rule of law-based society.
Executive Powers and Institutional Safeguards
The ways in which emergency powers are used can either support or hinder
transitions. For instance, when executive measures are necessary, proportionate,
and non-discriminatory, transitions can be supported by a government demonstrating
its willingness to protect its citizens. Where decision-making is inclusive of political
opponents and civil society, executive measures can be used in ways that reflect the
goals and aspirations of democratic deliberation.
In some cases, however, executives appear to have used the pandemic as an
excuse to consolidate power. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the president flatly
refused to recall the parliament which had been dissolved ahead of elections,
notwithstanding that the Constitution clearly requires such a recall in circumstances
such as a pandemic. The Supreme Court, in what appears to be an act of extreme
deference to the executive during a pandemic, also denied leave to proceed
to multiple challenges against the president’s refusal to act according to the
Constitution. The result was that the pandemic facilitated an executive takeover of
the state.
Although some degree of rights restrictions is necessary and legitimate in response
to the contagion, in transitioning societies, infringements of rights can be a point of
tension and potentially conflict. Expanded executive powers can also lead to human
rights violations, in contexts in which these are understood to have implications for
the conflict landscape. There are reported cases of infringements of the rights to
freedom of expression, assembly, privacy, and liberty in contexts such as Ethiopia,
Kenya, Nepal, the Central African Republic, and Sri Lanka. Human rights protections
are a central feature of transitions to both democracy and peace. For instance,
horizontal inequalities between groups, whereby certain sections of the population
have their rights protected while others are marginalised, can be a conflict trigger.
Human rights violations are often if not always a cause and consequence of conflict.
Peace negotiations thus place human rights centre stage to ensure that the same
violations which precipitated, and may arise again from a renewal of conflict, are not
replicated.
Transitioning societies also work towards establishing checks and balances on
power. However, the evolving nature of this process can hinder the capacity
of institutions to effectively constrain executive power. Some states previously
in transition have been subject to trends of democratic backsliding both prior
to and during the pandemic, and leaders seek to further consolidate power by
minimizing the capacity of state institutions to curb executives. Examples include
Sri Lanka and the Philippines. In other cases, state institutions are still evolving
and thus incapable of effectively constraining executive power. For example, in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, observers have questioned whether the
Constitutional Court is a broken shield when it failed to rule unconstitutional the
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failure of the president to achieve approval for a state of emergency from both
the Senate and the National Assembly as required by law. In other cases, the
limited role of institutional oversight can be explained by the lack of progress in
establishing the institutions necessary to contain executive action. For instance, a
State of Health Emergency was declared in Sudan, supported by Articles 40- 41
of the Constitution. The declaration of a state of emergency is extinguished if the
Legislative Council does not ratify it. However, Sudan does not have a legislature
and thus the emergency response could not be approved in ways required by its
Constitution.
Elections
In transitioning societies, elections are instrumental in conferring legitimacy on a
government and are frequently viewed as the end goal of any negotiated transition
and a key step in democratization. They have become the primary mechanism since
the Cold War for regulating political contestation among conflict parties emerging
from civil war through a negotiated settlement. Given the salience attached to
elections in transitioning societies, using emergency measures to suspend or delay
elections plays out in different ways in transitioning states. One perspective is that
delaying elections can support democracy because of lower turnouts as a result
of the pandemic, and the fact that transitioning societies can rarely deal with the
risks they expose their population to in elections. Another is that carrying on with
elections can guarantee democracy by ensuring that leaders are popularly elected.
Both arguments can be defended from a democracy standpoint.
However, elections also interact with Covid-19 and conflict dynamics in ways that
are wholly unpredictable. Covid-19 dynamics have often not been a decisive element
in what has emerged, but nonetheless have been an important part of the context.
In Ethiopia, parliamentary elections were originally planned for 29 August 2020. As
a result of Covid-19, the National Electoral Board announced that elections would
need to be postponed. Though there was broad understanding that postponement
was necessary, it was seen as particularly benefiting the federal ruling party. Some
opposition groups, particularly the Tigray’s People’s Liberation Front (TPLF),
considered the decision as ‘gamed.’ This exacerbated the political contestation
between the federal government and the Tigray politicians, who resigned after
accusing Prime Minister Abiy of authoritarian tendencies. The delaying of elections,
therefore, fed into an already volatile political climate and subsequently provided
the catalyst for renewed conflict. In Myanmar, elections were not delayed and
the National League for Democracy (NLD) won with a landslide. The success is
attributed, amongst other things, to a degree of success in the NLD’s handling of
the pandemic, that Aung San Suu Kyi remains the preferred leader of a majority
of the population, and that the NLD is the only option to continue the transition(s).
However, this victory significantly affected the military’s influence in the country and
led to the recent military coup. These examples demonstrate the unpredictability of
transitioning societies and the potential for fault lines to emerge.
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In the Central African Republic, presidential and legislative elections were
respectively due in December 2020 and March 2021. In March 2020, it became
evident that due to Covid-19, it would not be possible to hold the elections within the
constitutionally required deadline. The 2016 Constitution, however, imposes a two-
term limit on the president and prohibits any form of extension (Article 35); it also
prohibits amendment to the term limit provisions (Article 153). Since elections could
not be organized in the pandemic, delays would lead to a potential constitutional
and power vacuum. Legislators from the majority party, including the deputy speaker
of the National Assembly, proposed constitutional amendments under the notion
of ‘force majeure’. These aimed to amend Article 36, which establishes the period
within which presidential elections must be held before the end of the term of the
incumbent, and Article 68, which prescribes the period within which legislative
elections must be held. The proposed amendment received the support of two-
thirds of members of the National Assembly and was formally endorsed by the
cabinet on 15 May. The draft amendments were then submitted for review to the
Constitutional Court, as is required under constitutional amendment procedures.
The Court subsequently held that the Constitution includes ‘constitutional locks’,
which prevent any amendments pertaining to the number and duration of presidential
terms. Thus, differing from the example of Sri Lanka, the Constitutional Court acted
as a safety valve on emergency power. However, the example illustrates problems
associated with incomplete constitutions, which must themselves be updated to
cover new emergencies.
Sub-State Governance
When the origins of conflict revolve around identity, territorial power sharing is
often a device used to accommodate minority groups in peace settlements. These
arrangements, which can be along the lines of federalism, autonomy, or devolution,
seek to stave off demands for secession while at the same time affording substate
entities competences to govern themselves. The relationship between the state
and substate entities can be undermined or tested as a result of external shocks.
Given the salience of these arrangements to peace, the potential for violence or the
undoing of constitutional settlements are always a risk. 
Covid-19 response problems can stem from complex political and constitutional
arrangements on multi-level governance which flow from a political settlement.
For instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented state structure has made
crisis management more of a challenge, as the country failed to establish a
central organization to coordinate the crisis response. Emergency situations were
introduced separately on 16 March 2020 in the Bosniak-Croat Federation (state
of disaster) and the Serb Republic (state of emergency); and a state-wide state of
disaster introduced on 17 March 2020, as announced in the Official Gazette of BiH,
No. 18/20. In addition to a state-wide state of emergency, this has meant competing
and overlapping legal frameworks without a clear understanding as to which laws
prevail. Territorial power sharing arrangements can thus contribute to confusion
as to which laws apply and complicate coordination between different layers of
governance.
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Tensions can also emerge when the emergency law response is predicated on laws
that predate the new territorial political settlement. In Nepal, federalism emerged
as a hard-fought agenda of the peace process, which was inked into the 2015
Constitution. Despite being a core agenda of the peace process with a constitutional
mandate, Nepal’s federalisation process is incomplete and many political parties
continue to be ‘reluctant federalists’ averse to fundamentally transforming the
centralised system. Nepal enacted its Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act
2017 as one the first sectoral federal laws after the promulgation of the Constitution.
This defines a pandemic as a non-natural disaster. The Act sets out the institutional
mechanisms for disaster management from federal to local level, with clear roles
and responsibilities given to each level of government. Nevertheless, in response to
Covid-19, the Nepali government invoked the Infectious Disease Control Act 1964.
This Act in its legal grounding is broad, lacks specificity, and is indiscriminate in
terms of what is permitted. Most importantly, it does not specify the distribution of
powers amongst the levels of government, making it difficult to implement it in the
recently instituted federal system.
The pandemic has also exposed difficulties in substate arrangements around
capacity. For instance, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya reconfigured the balance
of power by devolving power and responsibilities from the national government to
47 elected county governments, creating a two-tier governance system. Health is a
fully devolved function in Kenya but has been a recurring point of tension since the
process of devolution began. A lack of resources – both in terms of financing and
administrative capacity – has also been a major issue in key service delivery issues,
such as health, with county governments ill-equipped to manage complex tasks,
such as dealing with this pandemic.
Militarising the State
In response to Covid-19, many countries have increased the role of the military.
While resorting to military capacity is legitimate, in some cases, the use of the
military operates as an extension of problematic efforts to further militarise civilian
roles that were ongoing prior to the pandemic. For instance, in the Philippines, the
government’s pandemic response has been highly militarised, with security forces
detaining thousands of people for violating curfew and killing many individuals.
President Duterte has deployed police and military forces to enforce emergency
measures, including issuing the military with shoot-to-kill orders against those
violating lockdown rules. In Sri Lanka, a pre-existing process of militarization of civil
administration has been accelerated by the pandemic.
In other cases, the use of the security apparatus is problematic for transition
because of roles played by the military during and prior to conflict, and potential
disruptions to ongoing security sector reform efforts. For instance, an unfinished
aspect of Nepal’s peace process has been the agenda of democratisation of the
Nepal Army. Processes have focused on ensuring civilian control of the Nepal
Army and its compliance with human rights. In response to Covid-19, however, the
government used the Nepal Army for different aspects of the pandemic response,
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particularly related to supply chain management. The Army, rather than the Health
Ministry, was put in charge of procuring medical supplies, setting up and managing
quarantine centres, and transporting people, among other tasks. In South Sudan,
the response to Covid-19 has been led by the High-Level Taskforce (HLTF) chaired
by the President and deputised by the First Vice President, Dr Riek Machar. The
HLTF includes national security services, the Ministry of Interior and the defence
forces, whose role is to enforce measures adopted by the taskforce including
controlling borders and enforcing compliance of testing and contact tracing. 
Although many countries called upon their security forces to help in managing the
pandemic, securitising the fight against the contagion can also erode the quest
for building constitutionalism and peacebuilding in transitioning settings. Poor
governance of the security sector is often a source of conflict and a key obstacle
to peacebuilding. Security forces are often the agents of state repression and have
been associated with major human rights abuses. Democratisation of a state is often
impossible without a transformation of the sector’s institutions and methods of their
oversight and control. Security sector reform is, therefore, a key aspect of transitions
and the use of security apparatus must be understood in context.
2021 Outlook
What then for conflict-affected states in transition going forward? In some cases,
Covid-19 and/or the responses to it have proved to be a catalyst for renewed conflict.
Myanmar is again under a military regime. Ethiopia descended into conflict in
December but has since renewed peace. While Covid-19 was not the central cause
in either, it has been a contributory factor by exacerbating, tangentially or directly,
pre-pandemic fault lines. The Sri Lankan government hoarded the credit for the
pandemic response through the absence of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny to win
a two-thirds majority in delayed parliamentary elections. It then used that majority
to enact a constitutional amendment that formalized its executive aggrandizement.
Tensions continue around the process of federalism in Nepal, and the Philippines
are continuing towards deconsolidating democracy.
Nevertheless, in identifying potential areas of tension, some points might be offered
for how to emerge from the pandemic in ways that seek to reduce the potential for
existing fault lines to undermine transitions in the future.   
Reform legal frameworks. The pandemic has helped to expose limits and
gaps in existing legal frameworks. In some cases, epidemics are not covered in
constitutional emergency provisions, limiting the options available to decision-
makers. In others, outdated legislation that remains in force has been used as the
enabling mechanism for emergency responses in opportunistic ways. There is an
opportunity to update these legal groundings and to harmonize legal frameworks so
as to ensure that rule of law-based responses can be adopted in future. Similarly,
opportunities exist for amending legislation in order to address the possibility that
elections cannot be held, and to obligate electoral management bodies to take the
steps necessary to plan for and mitigate risks of disruptions in future scenarios. In
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either case, law reform can help define the boundaries of emergency power in ways
that are clear and constitutional.
Addressing inter-governmental cooperation between central and sub-
state governments. The pandemic has exposed difficulties in some situations
of multi-layered governance, particularly where arrangements are complex and
identity-driven, and provides an opportunity to address these weaknesses. Efforts
could be focused on redrafting laws or clarifying constitutional arrangements
on issues of overlapping jurisdiction and distribution of powers. In this process,
properly delineating responsibilities and addressing the lack of inter-governmental
coordination mechanisms, and institutions and their capacity, could be pursued.
Building the capacity of sub-state entities to respond to external shocks could also
be prioritized.
Completing devolution of power-sharing arrangements. In such contexts
as South Sudan and Somalia, but also Nepal, the process of moving towards a
decentralized system of governance could be galvanized by the pandemic. As
governments in countries like the Philippines and Sri Lanka undermine transitions
towards democracy, it is possible that opposition will continue to grow in these
settings, pushing for reform and change. In this sense, recognizing the problems that
flow from incomplete systems could provide the impetus for further democratization,
particularly from civil society. 
Actively building trust across conflict lines. The pandemic has helped to identify
the continued existence of fault lines which, despite progress in building peace or
democracy, still remain. In recognizing the potential for these fault lines to undermine
transitions, renewed efforts can focus on building reconciliation and cooperation
between groups.
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